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by State and Federal Governments
for Offenses Arising Out of Same Act
The Supreme Court recently held in Bartkus v. Illinois' that an
acquittal in a federal court was no bar to a subsequent state prose-
cution for a state offense arising out of the same act and that such a
state prosecution was not a denial of due process under the four-
teenth amendment.2 In a companion case, Abbate v. United States,3
the Court held that a subsequent federal prosecution arising out of
the same acts which provided grounds for a prior state conviction
was not a violation of the protection against double jeopardy under
the fifth amendment.4
The Abbate decision was squarely in line with the rule of "suc-
cessive prosecutions" first handed down in United States v. Lanza."
In Lanza, the Court held that a federal prosecution was not barred
although the petitioner had been previously convicted for violating
a state statute proscribing the identical act.6 Although Lanza was
the first case to expressly reach this holding, there were dicta to the
1. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
2. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
Petitioner was acquitted in an Illinois federal court for robbery of a federally in-
sured savings and loan association. He was subsequently convicted by an Illinois state
court for the same act under an Illinois robbery statute. Affirmed, People v. Barus,
7 Ill. 2d 138, 130 N.E.2d 187 (1958).
3. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
4. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ....
Petitioners had been convicted by an Illinois state court for conspiring to destroy
telephone wires, and on the basis of the same conduct, were later convicted by a
Mississippi federal court for conspiring to destroy means of communication operated
by the United States. Affirmed, Abbate v. United States, 247 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.
1957).
5. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
6. Ibid. Prior to 1922, when faced with double prosecutions, the Court had always
found some technicality on which to base its decision thereby avoiding the double
jeopardy issue. For example, in United States v. Mason, 213 U.S. 115 (1909), the
Court strained to interpret a federal statute in order to prevent a federal prosecution
after a state court acquittal. A prior adjudication in a sham trial or court without
jurisdiction is not considered to be jeopardy. See, e.g., United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662 (1895). In Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907), the Court held
that a prior conviction by a Philippine court-martial barred a subsecuent prosecu-
tion by the Philippine criminal court on the basis that the court owed its existence
to and derived its powers from the federal government and was therefore not a
separate jurisdiction. See also Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1878).
same effect in earlier cases.7 The importance of Bartkus lies in the
fact that it is the first case to uphold a prosecution of an accused
who had previously been acquitted in another jurisdiction.8
An examination of the rule of successive prosecutions requires a
discussion of four factors. These factors are not mutually exclusive,
nor have all courts dealing with the problem recognized their exist-
ence; but in order to discuss the present state of the law, all four
factors must be taken into consideration. First, it must be determined
when a state can legislate in a criminal area already covered by
federal law. Second, once this determination is made, it is necessary
to strike a balance between the relative powers of the federal and
state governments and the rights of an individual accused. Reaching
this balance requires the application of the due process and double
jeopardy provisions of the Constitution. Third, in finding this bal-
ance, the courts often consider the effect on the law enforcement
procedures of the various jurisdictions. And finally, in order to apply
the concept of double jeopardy, courts must determine whether an
accused who has performed one criminal act has committed one
offense or several.
I. CONCURRENT LEGISLATION
The Lanza holding was based primarily on dicta uttered in cases
where the sole concern of the Court was the "dual sovereignty"
theory; this theory is based on the postulate that states may legislate
concurrently with Congress in the interest of protecting their own
citizens.9 In recent years, in delimiting the area in which concurrent
legislation is appropriate, the Court has been hesitant to find con-
gressional pre-emption in any particular field of criminal law.10 The
7. In Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820), the Court, holding that
the state could pass a statute proscribing an act that was already a federal crime,
stated, by means of dicta, that a state or federal conviction could be pleaded in bar
to a subsequent prosecution by the other authority for the same act. However, in
Moore v. llinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852), United States v. Marigold, 49 U.S.
(9 How.) 560 (1850), and Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847), cases with
holdings similar to that in Houston v. Moore, supra, the Court stated in dicta that
such a prior prosecution could not be pleaded in bar.
8. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150 (1959) (dissenting opinion). The majority
opinion in Bartkus scarcely notices this fact.
9. See cases cited note 7 supra. When opponents of the dual sovereignty theory
posed the problem of enforcing legislation against an accused already prosecuted by
the other jurisdiction, the Court answered this with dicta to the effect that conviction
in one jurisdiction would be no bar to a prosecution in the other. This dicta evoked
rousing dissents from Mr. Justice McLean who felt that if double prosecutions would
ensue, the state statutes should be declared unconstitutional. See Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S.
(5 How.) 410, 434 (1847).
10. See Cramton, The Supreme Court and State Power to Deal With Subversion
and Loyalty, 43 MiNN. L. REv. 1025, 1034 (1959). For a comprehensive discussion
of concurrent power and pre-emption, see generally, Grant, The Scope and Nature of
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existence of concurrent legislation led naturally to the conclusion
that states must be permitted to enforce their legislation, and the
result was the prospect of double prosecution by both state and
federal authorities. It is therefore not surprising that the Court in
Lanza determined that the need for giving efficacy to state legis-
lation was greater than the inescapable adverse effects of successive
prosecutions."
Strict adherence to the Lanza rule, with its emphasis on protection
of state interests, has led courts to apply the rule in situations sub-
stantially different from the facts of Lanza. 2 Thus, the affirmance of
a conviction after a prior acquittal, in Bartkus, was not an unfore-
seeable decision, since concern with the dual sovereignty theory
apparently continues to outweigh protection of the rights of an
individual accused. In any event, individual freedom against harass-
ing successive prosecutions has taken an impressive step backward.13
II. SuccEssivE PROSECUTIONS: DouBLE JEOPARDY AND DUE PIocEss
Courts have paid scant attention to the factual distinction between
a subsequent trial in a state court and one in a federal court.14 Many
Concurrent Power, 34 COLUm. L. RE-v. 995 (1934). For purposes of this discussion
it is important to note that in areas where the Constitution has not specifically dele-
gated a power to Congress, the Court will base its decision on the constitutionality of
a state statute on (1) specific congressional indication that the legislation is or is
not to be exclusive, (2) a clear-cut conflict with the federal statute or (3) the inten-
tion of Congress to pre-empt the field as evidenced by factors such as predominant
national interest, probable inconsistencies, pervasiveness, etc. See Note, Preemption
by Federal Criminal Statutes, 55 COLum. L. REV. 83 (1955). It is in area (3) above,
that the possibility of double prosecution may be a factor influencing the Court's de-
termination. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1951).
The prevalent theory today is that where the states retain the authority to legis-
late against offenses which are already federal crimes, they do so under their police
power to punish offenses against the state. However, where the purport of the state
statute is to aid the federal government in maintaining respect for federal institutions,
that statute is more likely to be declared unconstitutional than if it purports to pro-
tect a purely local interest. Cramton, supra, at 1033.
11. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
12. For example, a state conviction following a federal conviction was affirmed on
the basis of the precedent of Lanza. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 812 (1926). Be-
cause of the nature of the federal system, this is a substantial factual difference. See
notes 16-25 infra and accompanying text.
13. In Cramton, supra note 10, at 1029, there is an interesting observation which
seems applicable to the entire field of successive prosecutions:
Finally, the cases reviewing state power in this field reveal most clearly the con-
tinuing struggle of libertarian ideals with federalist principles. At times liber-
tarian victories have produced novel and creative constitutional doctrine. But a
resurgence of federalist concepts . . . has in most instances revived state power
and cast doubt on the precedent value of the earlier decisions upholding free-
dom against state action.
And see State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361, 376 (1833): "it is better that the residue of
the offense go unpunished, than . . . to sanction a practice which might be rendered
an instrument of oppression to the citizen."
14. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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relevant policy arguments -premised on fundamental rights of an
accused- for prohibiting second prosecutions are equally appli-
cable to both courts, but there are significant constitutional
differences.
When, as in Abbate, the subsequent prosecution is in a federal
court, the fifth amendment is relevant. And pursuant to the Lanza
test, the fifth amendment prohibits "a second prosecution under
authority of the Federal government after a first trial for the same
offense under the same authority." I5 But the edict of the fifth amend-
ment need not be restricted to those prosecutions delineated in the
Lanza test. As pointed out by the dissent in Abbate,16 it is arguable,
on the basis of the language of that amendment and the debate
surrounding its adoption, 7 that the framers of the Bill of Bights
intended to prohibit a prosecution by the federal government of any
offender who had previously been prosecuted for the same offense
in any jurisdiction.'
The standards of procedure in the federal courts are not limited
by the "minimal historic safeguards of due process" but are based
upon broader standards consonant with liberal theories of criminal
justice.' 9 The concept of double jeopardy was not meant to be hinged
15. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). (Emphasis added.) Be-
fore any case determining the scope of concurrent power under the eighteenth
amendment reached the Supreme Court, the lower courts divided on the interpreta-
tion of concurrent jurisdiction. This was partly due to the peculiar phraseology of
the eighteenth amendment which led some courts to believe that state laws govern-
ing prohibition were passed in enforcement of the federal statute. Compare United
States v. Holt, 270 Fed. 639 (D.N.D. 1921); United States v. Bostow, 273 Fed.
535 (S.D. Ala. 1921), with United States v. Peterson, 268 Fed. 864 (W.D. Wash.
1920). But cf. State v. Smith, 101 Ore. 127, 199 Pac. 194 (1921).
16. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 203 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
17. See 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 753 (1789) (1789-1824). As originally worded, the
double jeopardy provision read: "No person shall be subject . . . to more than one
punishment or one trial for the same offense." A proposed amendment, seeking to
add the words "by any law of the United States" at the conclusion of the provision
was defeated in the first Congress. Ibid.
18. This argument is bolstered by the fact that at the time the fifth amendment
was promulgated, the common law prohibited prosecutions after a prior conviction
for the same offense in another jurisdiction. Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive
Prosecutions, 32 CoLum. L. Rev. 1309, 1329 (1932). This is significant in that com-
mon law rights have been stated to provide the minimum standard in interpreting
the first ten amendments, and that constitutional safeguards of civil liberties are to
be interpreted to give the individual an even wider protection than that given by the
common law. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1885); Grant, supra at
1329. Also see Franck, An International Lawyer Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34 N.Y.
U.L. REv. 1096 (1959); Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State and Nation: Com-
mon Law and British Empire Comparison, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1 (1956).
19. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943):
[T]he scope of our reviewing power over convictions brought here from the fed-
eral courts is not confined to ascertainment of Constitutional validity. Judicial
supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies
the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure ...
Cf. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
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upon technical refinements, 2 nor need it be.2 In McNabb v. United
States22 the Court exercised its supervisory authority over the federal
courts to exclude improperly obtained evidence. The majority in
McNabb did not consider itself confined to minimal tests of consti-
tutional validity, but looked more toward "the formulation and
application of proper standards for the enforcement of Federal
Criminal Law in the Federal courts." 23 Accordingly, in a case such
as Abbate, the Court should not feel confined to minimal constitu-
tional safeguards when reviewing convictions in the lower federal
courts following a conviction for the same offense in a state court.
Rather, the supervisory powers of the Court should be exercised on
a case-by-case basis to protect an offender from the harassment in-
herent in multiple trials. In this respect, the Court need do no more
than it did in McNabb.24
But when, as in Bartkus, the second trial is in a state court, the
Court has stated that it must give greater weight to the state court's
expressions of criminal justice.25 Although the double jeopardy pro-
vision of the fifth amendment does not apply to the states as such,
there is no question that at some point harassment of an accused
will violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8
In Palko v. Connecticut17 it was held that a state statute permitting
the state to appeal upon an allegation of error in a criminal case was
not a violation of the fourteenth amendment. In Bartkus, the Court
apparently relied on Palko for establishing the proposition that put-
ting a man on trial twice for the same offense is never a violation of
the fourteenth amendment.2 In view of the express limitations
20. E.g., People v. Spitzer, 148 Misc. 97, 102, 266 N.Y.S. 522, 528 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
21. In Clark, Forward: A Symposium in Fitting the Punishment to the Criminal, 31
IowA L. REv. 191 (1946), the author states "We now realize that harsh punishment
does not protect society or prevent the offender from again engaging in crime." The
aims of criminal law are controversial. Among the many aims advanced are protection
of society, deterrence of future crime and rehabilitation of the criminal. See HALL &
GLrrEc, CumINAr LAw AND ENFORCEUMNT 14-28 (2d ed. 1958). Among these
various theories only the retributive or revenge motive would appear to justify 'suc-
cessive prosecutions. Few modem legal writers espouse this theory.
In United States v. Candelaria, 131 F. Supp. 797 (S.D. Cal. 1955), the federal
judge, incensed at the fact that the state intended to prosecute the defendant im-
mediately upon his release from federal prison and believing that this further pros-
ecution would entirely ruin the efficacy of the rehabilitation program set up for the
defendant (who, because of state law, could no longer be allowed the freedom of
the prison farm but was placed under maximum security when the state government
placed a detainer on him), reduced sentence from five years to sixty days.
22. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
23. Id. at 340.
24. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 18-22, Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
25. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
26. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 318 (1937).
27. 302 U.S. 318 (1937).
28. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124-25 (1959).
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placed on the decision in Palko29 the Court's reliance is unneces-
sarily strong.
A reading of decisions applying the rule of successive prosecutions
both before and after Lanza reveals a great hesitancy on the part ofjudges to subject an accused to double prosecutions. These decisions
rendered suspended sentences, nominal penalties, or admonitions to
other courts and prosecuting officials to enforce double penalties
only in extraordinary circumstances.30 Fifteen state legislatures, ap-
parently sharing this attitude toward successive prosecutions, have
enacted statutes setting up prosecutions in other jurisdictions as a bar
to prosecutions in their own jurisdictions for the same offense.31 In
order to determine whether a state has violated the fourteenth
amendment by prosecuting an accused subsequent to a federal con-
viction or acquittal arising out of the same act, the Court need only
look to statements of courts reiterating the seemingly fimdamental
proposition that defendants are denied justice if prosecuted twice
for the same offense.32 It is clear that a denial of fundamental justice
is a denial of due process.33
29. "What the answer would have to be if the state were permitted after a trial
free from error to try the accused over again or to bring another case against him,
we have no occasion to consider." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 818, 328 (1937).
30. Some examples of judicial attitudes on successive prosecutions can be found
in: United States v. Candelaria, 131 F. Supp. 797 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (see note 21
supra); United States v. Regan, 273 Fed. 727, 729 (D.N.H. 1921) (double jeopardy
is obnoxious to the ordinary conception of right); United States v. Ratagczak, 275
Fed. 558 (N.D. Ohio 1921) (judge will give full weight to any former punishment);
United States v. Holt, 270 Fed. 639 (D.N.D. 1921) (nominal penalty); United States
v. Palan, 167 Fed. 991, 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1909); United States v. Amy, 24 Fed. Cas.
792, 811 (No. 14445) (D. Va. 1859) ("the court would have felt it its duty to sus-
end sentence .. "); People v. Welch, 141 N.Y. 266, 280, 36 N.E. 328, 842
1894); Jett v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 933, 959 (1868); State v. An-
tonio, 3 Brev. 562 (S.C. 1816).
31. Amuz. CODE ANN. § 43-6102 (1939); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 656 (Deering
1949); IDAHo CODE ANN. § 19-315 (1949); IiN. STAT. ANN. § 9-215 (Burns 1933);
MmN. STAT. § 610.23 (1957); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 2432 (1942); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. §§ 94-4703, -5617 (1947); NEV. Comm. LAws § 9963 (Hillyer 1929); N.Y.
PEN. LAw § 33, and N.Y. CODE Can. PRoc. § 139; N.D. REv. CODE §§ 12-0505,
29-0313 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 25, tit. 22, § 130 (1951); ORE. 1Ev.
STAT. § 131.240(1) (1953); S.D. CODE §§ 13.0506, 34.0813 (1939); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 76-1-25, 77-8-8 (1953); WAsn. REv. CODE § 10.43.040 (1951). See also
Tmc. CODE Cnm. Poc. ANN. art. 208 (1954); Wis. STAT. § 939.71 (Supp. 1957).
In MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.11, comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956), there is a pro-
vision pursuant to which a former prosecution in another jurisdiction would be a bar
to further prosecution for the same offense in the jurisdiction adopting the provision.
32. See Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 429 (1953) ; Ciucci v. Illinois, 356
U.S. 571 (1958) (dissent). In Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957),
the Court stated that:
the state with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make re-
peated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subject-
ing him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
83. E.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 318, 325 (1937). where the Court says
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III. Tim EFFECT OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PROCESS
ON rim Ru=E OF SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTIONS
An underlying problem raised by the instant cases is the apparent
fear by each government that the other will somehow subvert its law
enforcement process through a sham or otherwise ineptly conducted
trial, minimal penalty or executive pardon.34 Moreover, there may be
apprehension that the offender, knowing of a bar to further prosecu-
tion, would submit himself to the jurisdiction having the lesser
penalty in order to avoid trial in the jurisdiction having the more
severe.
However, Congress can, in any field where it is empowered to
legislate, specifically pre-empt that field or, at least, impose minimum
penalties binding upon the states. 5 If Congress does not expressly
pre-empt a field of criminal law, it has been shown that in some
instances courts will look for remedies against double prosecutions, 36
either reading pre-emption into or narrowly interpreting a federal
statute, in order to restrict the area of concurrence between the
federal and state laws.37 In the event of federal pre-emption, the
states would find themselves powerless to exercise means of the
self-protection that is at the root of the concurrent legislation issue.38
The Bartkus case might have been resolved in favor of petitioner
on the narrow grounds that "the extent of participation of the federal
authorities here constituted this state prosecution actually a second
federal prosecution." 9 At the least, the high degree of federal-state
cooperation in Bartkus seriously undercuts the argument that if a
that a violation of due process is a violation of "a principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."
34. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 156 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
35. See Note, Preemption by Federal Criminal Statutes, 55 CoLOM. L. REV. 83
(1955).
36. See text accompanying note 30 supra and cases cited therein.
37. In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), the Court found that Con-
gress bad pre-empted the area of sedition on the basis of implied congressional intent
plus dominant federal interest and said in dicta, "we will not assume that Congress
intended to permit the possibility of double punishment." Id. at 510. In Jerome v.
United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943), the non-existence of a bar to further prosecu-
tion by the state led the Court to define a federal statute narrowly in order to re-
strict the area in which the two statutes overlapped.
38. Cf. notes 9-13 supra and accompanying text.
39. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 165-66 (1959) (Mr. Justice Brennan dis-
senting joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas). Mr. Justice
Brennan points out, id. at 165, 167:
It is clear that federal officers solicited the state indictment, arranged to secure
the attendance of key witnesses, unearthed additional evidence to discredit Bart-
kus and one of his alibi witnesses, and in general prepared and guided the state
prosecution. Thus the State's Attorney stated at the state trial: "I am particularly
glad to see a case where the federal authorities came to see the state's attorney."
And Illinois conceded with commendable candor on the oral argument in this
Court "that the federal officers did instigate and guide this state prosecution"
and "actually prepared this case." Indeed, the State argued the case on the
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conviction by one "sovereignty" barred a prosecution by the other,
an offender could simply surrender to the jurisdiction with the
smaller penalty. Not only is it unlikely that a person will voluntarily
submit to the police of any jurisdiction, but assuming that he does, it
by no means follows that the sovereignty which first gains control
over him will try him. Rather, as the facts of Bartkus indicate, it is
quite likely that federal and state authorities would make a joint
decision to bring him to trial in the jurisdiction which imposes the
higher penalty.40
The argument that one jurisdiction could subvert the law enforce-
ment processes of the other is put forth by a few of the same officials
who protest most loudly against certain exclusionary rules,41 on the
grounds that citizens must have faith in their officials to do their jobs
properly and that this confidence must not be undercut by court-
imposed restrictions. 4' A leading public figure has stated that "de-
mocracy is a failure" unless trust of law enforcement officials exists.43
Therefore, the anomalous conclusion: law enforcement officials are
basis that the record showed as a matter of "fair inference" that the case was
one in which "federal officers bring to the attention of the state prosecuting au-
thority the commission of an act and furnish and provide him with evidence of
defendant's guilt."
Pursel's testimony at the state trial, that Bartkus had told him he participated in
the robbery, was obviously damaging. Yet, indicative of the attitude of the fed-
eral officials that this was actually a federal prosecution, the FBI agent arranged
no interview between Pursel and any state authority. The first time that Pursel
had any contact whatsoever with a state official connected with the case of [the
two self-confessed participants in the robbery for which Barticus was prosecuted],
Pursel's sentencing was postponed until after he testified against Bart=s at the
state trial.
Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Fed-
eral Courts, 43 Mim . L. REv. 1083, 1182-83 n.842 (1959).
The danger that the federal system may be exploited to circumvent the procedural
rights of the accused far transcends the double jeopardy context. For the view that
federal-state "cooperation" is seriously cutting into the protections against self-
incrimination, unreasonable search and seizure and illegal detention, as well as double
jeopardy, see Kamisar, supra, at 1177-90.
40. Cf. Testimony of Assistant Attorney General Warren Olney, pointing out that
"frequently [in narcotic cases] Federal and local officers work in close cooperation,
and the cases, depending on [inter alia] ... the extent of the penalties that can be
imposed. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on. Traffic in, and Control of, Narcotics,
Barbiturates and Amphetamines of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1190, 1197 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
It is interesting to note that in Jett v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 933,
958-59 (1868), the court discounted any possibility of collusion arising from the rule
of successive prosecutions on the ground of its high degree of faith in the state and
federal authorities.
41. See 1 Naw Yonn CONSaTTuTnONAL CONvmNTION, REVmED REcoRD 373 (1938).
For an example of the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence in the federal
courts, see McNabb v. United States, 818 U.S. 332 (1943).
42. 1 NEw Yoax CoNsTrUrONAL. CoNvaNTmoN, REVisED REconD, supra note 41,
at 373.
43. Statement of Thomas E. Dewey in I N w YoRK CoNsTrrunToNAL CoNvmEN o
REVISxD IEcoRD, supra note 41, at 373.
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to be trusted in certain areas of criminal procedure, such as search
and seizure and detention, but not in other areas, such as successive
prosecutions.
It may be argued that the "power" to re-prosecute does not neces-
sarily mean that any offender will be so prosecuted unless extra-
ordinary circumstances demand. The Attorney General of the United
States sent a statement to all United States Attorneys immediately
after the Abbate decision to the effect that the authority given them
by that decision was to be used sparingly and only with his personal
approval.44 The gist of this statement is to set up the criterion that
successive prosecutions may occur only under extraordinary circum-
stances,45 with the Attorney General of the United States as final
arbiter of when these circumstances exist. The prosecutor's discre-
tion is hardly a substitute for a constitutional safeguard. In any
event, if extraordinary circumstances which existed in Abbate (a
more severe federal penalty) and in Bartkus (failure of federal offi-
cials to obtain a conviction at the first trial) are examples of the
limitations which the Court (or the Attorney General) will place on
the rule of successive prosecutions, the criterion is worthless. For, as
a practical matter, these are virtually the only circumstances in
which a jurisdiction will feel it worthwhile to try an accused already
prosecuted elsewhere.
IV. SEPA ATE OFFENSES
The application of the fifth amendment's prohibition against the
federal government's twice placing a person in jeopardy hinges upon
a determination that the accused was twice tried for the same
offense.46 It is conceivable that one act could violate two or more
statutory provisions, and to discover whether several distinguishable
statutes create one offense or several, the legislative intent must be
ascertained.47 The test presently used by the Court to determine
legislative intent in such circumstances 48 is that set forth in Block-
44. See 27 U.S.L. Wxmx 2509 (April 7, 1959).
45. In Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 434 (1847), the dictum to the effect
that a conviction in one jurisdiction would be no bar to a prosecution in the other was
modified by the confidence of the Court that such double prosecutions would only
be brought in extraordinary circumstances. This confidence was echoed in United
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
46. According to the Lanza test, the fifth amendment prohibits prosecutions by the
federal government of an offender previously tried for the same offense by the same
authority. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
47. See Kircheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J.
513 (1949). Historically, the courts have set up a variety of tests and rules of statu-
tory interpretation to make this determination. For purposes of this discussion the
most important are the "same evidence" and "same transaction" tests.
48. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 388 (1958). A recent reafrmation of
the Blockburger test can be found in United States v. Sabella, 28 U.S.L. W= 2227
(U.S. Nov. 24, 1959).
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burger v. United States:49 "ascertain whether each statutory pro-
vision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
not." i0
In Abbate, the Government made an alternative argument, con-
tending that the fifth amendment had no application to the case
because the two prosecutions were under statutes which required
slightly different evidence for conviction and which protected dif-
ferent social and political interests.51 In effect, the Government
asserted that the Blockburger test, which had theretofore only been
applied to multiple indictments at one federal trial, should be ap-
plied to the area of successive prosecutions. A strict application of
the Blockburger test to the facts in Abbate would have resulted in a
holding that the defendant had committed two distinct offenses and
had no grounds for appealing on the basis of the fifth amendment.
In applying the Blockburger test, no distinction has been made
between successive trials for multiple offenses committed in one
transaction, and multiple indictments at one trial for each statute
violated or offense committed.52 However, this distinction is pre-
sented for the first time in Abbate in a separate opinion written by
Mr. Justice Brennan which did not form part of the holding but
refuted the Government's alternative argument.53 Mr. Justice Brennan
feared that a theory such as that proposed by the Government could
be applied to two federal prosecutions for separate statutory viola-
tions arising out of the same act if that act were a violation of federal
statutes designed to protect separate federal interests. Accordingly,
he refuted the Government's contention on the ground that this
would constitute such harassment of the defendant as to be forbidden
by the fifth amendment. He supported his argument by noting the
fact that the Blockburger test has never been used to subject a de-
fendant in the federal courts to multiple trials for several offenses
arising out of the same act but merely to permit multiple indictments
49. 284 U.S. 299 (1933).
50. Id. at 304:
where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statu-
tory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two of-
fenses or only one, is whether each requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not.
This is often referred to as the "same evidence" test as opposed to the "same trans-
action" test.
51. A vital element of the Blockburger test is the existence of separate interests
protected by the statutes as well as separate evidentiary requirements. See Kirch-
eimer, supra note 47, at 524.
52. See Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958) (dissenting opinion). Although
Mr. Justice Brennan points out in his separate opinion in Abbate that the Supreme
Court has never upheld multiple trials for offenses arising out of the same act, this
appears to be the first time any Justice on the Court has made this observation, Pjd
it has never been so held.
53. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 196 (1959) (separate opinion).
19601
544 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
at one trial.54 He added that technical tests based on determining
whether two statutes protect different interests or have different
evidentiary requirements cannot stand when the "prime considera-
tion is the protection of the accused from the harassment of succes-
sive prosecutions." " In his opinion, the constitutional alternative to
multiple trials would be multiple indictments at one trial, and the
federal cases holding that one act constituted multiple offenses have
dealt with just this fact situation. 6
It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Brennan dissented in
Ciucci v. Illinois,5" a case holding that a state may prosecute by
multiple trials for separate offenses arising out of one transaction,
since the basis of the dissent was the unreasonableness of multiple
trials in state courts when the state might have served multiple in-
dictments at one trial.5 Moreover, it is also significant that Mr.
54. Id. at 197.
55. Id. at 200.
56. See, e.g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); Bell v. United States,
349 U.S. 81 (1955); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1933); Morgan
v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915); Contra, Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338
(1911). Although this latter case involved two trials, Mr. Justice Brennan distin-
guishes it on the basis of the peculiarities of Philippine common law. 359 U.S. at
198.
Although a criminal accused would, in most cases, receive an identical sentence
with multiple indictments at one trial as with multiple trials, the abuse that Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan envisages is that of a defendant, acquitted at one trial, being successive-
ly retried by the state until a conviction is secured. In Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571
(1958), the defendant, accused of murdering his wife and three children at the same
time, bad been placed on trial for each killing separately until a jury finally brought
in the death penalty at his third trial. At this point the state ceased trying him. The
Court held no double jeopardy or violation of the fourteenth amendment, Mr. Justice
Brennan dissenting.
57. 356 U.S. 571 (1958). Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958), affirms the
Ciucci holding. That case also involved the question of res judicata in criminal pro-
ceedings. Res judicata can be invoked in criminal proceedings. Sealfon v. United
States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948). In the case of a prior acquittal on a separate charge
involving substantially the same facts, arguments have been made for invoking the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. The problems here are basically (1) in the event of
a jury verdict it is usually indeterminable exactly what the factual basis for the ver-
dict was; (2) it is doubtful whether a failure to apply collateral estoppel can be col-
laterally attacked; and (3) in cases involving trials in two jurisdictions the issue arises
whether the requisite identity of parties is present. The Supreme Court has said, how-
ever, that in certain instances, by looking at the instructions given to the jury and
the general circumstances surrounding the case it is possible to ascertain the actual
basis of the verdict (especially in the situation where an acquittal could not have
been rendered in the absence of a specific factual determination). Sealfon v. United
States, supra. For a general discussion of this topic see Lugar, Criminal Law, Double
jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IowA L. BEv. 319 (1954).
58. 356 U.S. at 575.
No constitutional problem would have arisen if petitioner had been prosecuted
in one trial for as many murders as there were victims. But by using the same
evidence in multiple trials the State continued its relentless prosecutions until it
got the result it wanted. . . . This is . . . unseemly and oppressive use of a
criminal trial that violates the concept of due process ...
COMMENTS
Justice Brennan uses Palko v. Connecticut,9 a case involving two
state trials, in support of the proposition that no government shall
wear out an accused by a multitude of trials. Thus, it would seem
that the same reasoning which led Mr. Justice Brennan to declare
that two federal trials for offenses arising out of the same transaction
would be unconstitutional under the fifth amendment, would apply
equally to the states under the fourteenth amendment.
In a situation where the defendant is prosecuted by two jurisdic-
tions, multiple trials are inevitable. Mr. Justice Brennan also wrote
the majority opinion in Abbate, and in that opinion he accepted the
theory expounded by most of the cases he used as authority: suc-
cessive prosecutions are constitutional because each jurisdiction has
a separate interest to protect. However, this is inconsistent with the
theme of his separate opinion that technical tests such as separate
interests are not valid in the face of continued harassment. Logically,
it cannot be said that a defendant is any less harassed in two trials
when the prosecuting attorneys bear the authority of two jurisdic-
tions than when they represent only one.60
Beyond discussing a long-neglected distinction in the area of
separate offenses, that is, the distinction between multiple indict-
ments and multiple trials, the separate opinion is important in its
potentially far-reaching effects. Suppose successive prosecutions by
state and federal authorities were to be held unconstitutional and
the Government retained its alternative argument. Assuming this
argument to be valid, a slight change in a state statute, perhaps the
addition of a few minor evidentiary requirements, would have the
effect of taking the prosecution beyond the reach of attack on con-
stitutional grounds by creating separate offenses. Moreover, an ex-
cellent argument could be made that, by definition, the statutes of
two jurisdictions create separate offenses for purposes of double
jeopardy. In this situation, rather than applying the Blockburger
test, the courts should look beyond such technical evidentiary tests
to the substance of the statutes in an attempt to determine whether
two substantively different crimes exist.
Assume a situation, such as that in Bartkus, where the state and
federal statutes differ basically only to the extent that the federal
statute requires an allegation that the robbery occurred on federal
property while the state statute requires an allegation of robbery.
Thus, if the only defense in a prior federal trial was that the pro-
59. 802 U.S. 318 (1937).
60. In Franck, An International Lawyer Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34 N.Y.U.L.
Ev. 1096, 1103 (1959), a solution was proposed whereby the state and federal au-
thorities would cooperate to present all evidence at one trial, perhaps with multiple
indictments. This procedure would be consonant both with the theories of dual sov-
ereignty and Mr. Justice Brennan's separate opinion.
1960]
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perty in question did not belong to the federal government, and the
defendant was acquitted, a subsequent prosecution should not be
barred. In this event, the defendant would not have been tried
substantively for the same offense which the state condemns.' This
should be the only situation whereby the defendant should be put
to a retrial.
Although not binding as authority, Mr. Justice Brennan's separate
opinion may be a ray of hope to those who would see the Court
considering each case on its substantive merits to the end of more
justice in criminal procedure and disregarding mechanical formulae
in the administration of the criminal law.
There are many who argue that the unrestricted holdings in the
instant cases are inconsistent with the protection given a criminal
defendant by the double jeopardy and due process provisions of the
Constitution.62 Moreover, at least one member of Congress has ad-
vanced a solution which would abrogate the instant decisions.63 The
displeasure of many courts with prosecuting any man twice has
taken many forms.6 That the rule of successive prosecutions causes
such difficulty is strong evidence that it is not consonant with our
notions of fairness in criminal procedure.
61. In this fact situation the problems encountered in the area of res judicata (see
note 57 supra) are avoided. Thus, the defendant, by his plea, could effectively bar
the use of his acquittal for any purpose other than a showing that the property did
not belong to the federal government. The issue of his commission of the act has not
been adjudicated.
62. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 60; Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecu-
tions, 32 CoLTnm. L. Rrv. 1309 (1932); Note, Preemption by Federal Criminal Stat-
utes, 55 CoLum. L. RE V. 83 (1955).
63. See H.R. 6176, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). "A Bill to Amend title 18 U.S.C.
entitled 'Crimes and Criminal Procedure' to provide that prior adjudication on the
merits by any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal, should bar prosecu-
tion for similar acts committed against the same person and State." This bill has as
yet not been acted upon by the House Judiciary Committee. The avowed purpose of
its sponsor was to give effect to the minority opinions in the instant cases. Letter
from Thomas J. Lane, Member U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Ju-
diciary, sent to and on file in the offices of Minnesota Law Review, Sept. 29, 1959.
64. See notes 30, 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
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